




NORWEGIAN  
REFUGEE COUNCIL



# Real-time Evaluation of the MIRE II Consortium

**"PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE  
TO NEWLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND CONFINED  
COMMUNITIES IN COLOMBIA"**

**FUNDED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION – CIVIL PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN AID  
(DG ECHO)**

**FINAL REPORT**

APRIL 2022

**.iecah.**

Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria  
Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action

### **Presentation of the Report**

This Report is a synthesis of the real-time Evaluation Report of the **MIRE II Project** carried out by the **Institute of Studies on Conflict and Humanitarian Action (IECAH)** and covering the period between December 2021 and April 2022 and presented as **Annex 0**.

The expository logic of the evaluation findings in this Report is presented in the form of an answer to the evaluation questions that have been prioritized based on the most conclusive and relevant obtained information, while in the extensive Report on Annex 0 (In Spanish) the reader will find an expository logic, structured by evaluation criteria and by processes.

In order to respect the formal requirements, the general and specific conclusions and recommendations are included in the two final chapters of the longer annexed document.

### **Evaluation Team (IECAH)**

<b>EVALUATION TEAM MEMBERS</b>		<b>GENERAL PROFILE</b>	<b>ROLES</b>
<b>IECAH COORDINATING TEAM</b>	<b>FRANCISCO REY MARCOS</b>	Expert in Humanitarian Aid/ Protection	Supervisor and advisor of the evaluation process as a whole in the technical and administrative aspects. Specific analysis on protection, IHL, quality and consistency of aid, compliance with regulations and adherence to best practices.
	<b>CAMILLE NUSSBAUM</b>	Expert in quality, accountability and learning	Administrative Coordinator. Quality Analyst of information and processes. Analyst of international best practices in humanitarian aid and adherence to Sphere regulations. Systematization and formulation.
<b>FIELD AND TECHNICAL TEAM</b>	<b>JUAN PERIS-MENCHETA</b>	Technical Coordinator, Evaluation Expert	Technical Coordinator of the Evaluation. Transversal Analyst of all the components, with emphasis on technical and financial coordination, governance, management flows, Information and Communication Systems and Visibility.
	<b>MANUELA ANGEL</b>	Expert in humanitarian aid / Protection and Food Security	Advisor in Food Security Components, and Protection. Development and application of evaluation tools. Analysis and Systematization.
	<b>DAYANA DELUQUE SUAREZ</b>	Expert in humanitarian aid / WASH and Shelter	Advisor in WASH and Shelter Components. Elaboration and application of evaluative tools. Analysis and Systematization.
	<b>ALEJANDRA MENDOZA</b>	Expert in Humanitarian Aid/Health	Advisor on Health Components (including Covid-19) and Shelter.

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© Norwegian Refugee Council  
Contact: IECAH.  
camille.nussbaum@iecah.org

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# 1 Executive Summary

As a historical interagency process, the MIRE Consortium was born from the confluence of a series of contextual objective needs of both a strictly humanitarian nature and the necessary optimization of aid, at a time when international resources for humanitarian aid in Colombia fell sharply. Above all, it arises from a willingness on the part of the ECHO donor and its member partners to bring closer and complement their technical expertise to consolidate a more efficient and comprehensive care model in terms of attention for people in need of assistance and protection in the Colombian humanitarian crisis. MIRE finds its immediate predecessor in NRC's Rapid Response Unit, of which the first one is an amplification. During its 3 years of life, it has undergone a series of structural, methodological and operational modifications in parallel to its running-in, to its **successful insertion in the Colombian humanitarian architecture**, while it has generated notable impacts on the protection of lives and the relief of suffering.

In its conception and design, the MIRE presents a **full historical and functional relevance**, both for the volume of aid it conveys, and for its intrinsic characteristics, among which its ability to assume with flexibility its function as a respondent of last resort for the coverage of gaps in care and protection for victims of the armed conflict and the violence derived from territorial disputes between armed groups. MIRE's proposal in its design and operation not only finds perfect accommodation in the Colombian humanitarian architecture, but also covers its deficiencies both in aspects of coverage and quality of the operation (intersectorality), contributing to the widening and improvement of humanitarian practices in the country. As a third-line respondent, MIRE has been able to reach where no one could reach and in times when no one could mobilize its contingents, which has fully justified and justifies its continuity and the need for its strengthening. It has also enjoyed increasing recognition by the national, departmental and local authorities of the country, the national and international humanitarian community, and the population, reaching a position today as a mechanism of last resort, essential according to humanitarian actors, to cover the gaps in care.

Formally, in terms of **external coherence and alignment**, the MIRE responds, aligns and structures itself in its design with international norms and humanitarian standards and national legislative plans and bodies in an appropriate manner. In terms of adequacy of the response to a country in which there is an institutionality and, in principle, sufficient public resources to address humanitarian crises, this evaluation has pointed out the risks that its full adaptation to the political-institutional context and its sustainability may cause a too centralized operating model.

With regard to **internal coherence**, despite responding and articulating itself in a coherent manner to its General Objective, the Logical Framework of the MIRE II Project presents a series of technical inadequacies ranging from the setting of targets estimated almost exclusively in absolute values (therefore unrelated to the different effective coverage needs) to the provision of indicators and means of verification that are clearly insufficient and improvable, which calls for an in-depth reformulation for its optimization for the next phases.

As for its **coverage**, the Consortium has positioned itself in just two years of existence as an essential instrument, according to OCHA, to complement emergency humanitarian care in Colombia. According to the calculations made by the evaluation team, the MIRE Consortium would have attended around 40% of the population victims of acts of armed violence derived from the conflict in Colombia in the period 2020-2021 and doing this by intervening in just over 20% of all emergencies declared for this cause. MIRE is making a fundamental contribution to international humanitarian aid focused on emergencies arising from the armed conflict and other related violence, both in quantitative and qualitative terms.

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With strict regard to **effectiveness**, the evaluation team has detected a highly satisfactory level of progress in compliance for all expected results. A structural problem remains in the Consortium's improvement curve that must be urgently solved from a determined technical approach, and that is the one referred to the practical absence of a reliable feedback mechanism that informs operators and decision makers of the Consortium about the quality of the aid provided from the point of view of the beneficiaries. This aspect is closely related to the internal coherence previously addressed and that affects the effective verifiability of compliance with the General Objective and Goal of the intervention: without the ability of the beneficiaries to express their complaints, claims and suggestions for improvement in a sufficient, timely and reliable manner. With regard to more qualitative aspects related to efficiency, there is much room for improvement in several crucial aspects such as the **comprehensiveness** of the aid provided by the MIRE (the Consortium carries out operations that are still between multisectorality with some cases of **intersectorality**), the adequacy **of response times and permanence times** depending on the specific typologies of events attended, and the objective needs of assistance and protection of populations in need.

In relation to the **management of financial resources** and other aspects of **efficiency**, although the evaluation has not been able to infer from the available information and time, the cost-efficiency analysis that would merit an experience such as MIRE for the complete determination of its added value, it has been possible to establish a correct level of execution of financial resources in relation to the execution time and compliance with the goals.

At the level of **management flows**, the Consortium has been adapting its process and personnel structure to the priorities and needs it has been facing operationally. This has necessarily meant learning "on the fly" and somewhat erratically. Even so, the Consortium has consolidated in just two years of existence a Management Unit that, with very scarce resources and exposed to a great burden of responsibility, but endowed with great professional quality, has been able to link work processes that are still located for the most part to the entire discretion of the partners and that therefore present a very complex interagency articulation (consortium) and many times with deep dissent and not commonly accepted decisions that have been able to erode the necessary trust between the partners and also harm the performance of the operation. Among the most notable deficit aspects we find the absence of depth and clear delimitation of competences and functions in the current organic-functional scheme and the absence of a human resources policy that guarantees an aggregate productivity and a stable, safe work environment with guaranteed rights for technical personnel, especially those with exclusive dedication to the MIRE and with more field responsibilities.

At the level of **results**, the Consortium presents a modest but solvent and solid collection of good practices in each sector that should serve as an operational basis and inspire both methodological and procedural improvements (in almost all sectors) and a greater scalability of its operations and their quality. It is necessary to consolidate aspects of quality of operations, the revision for the improvement of data collection instruments, the introduction of less intensive aid modalities in personnel and logistical loads (multipurpose cash), the strengthening of the protection component as a nuclear sector and at the same time transversal to all the intervention of the Consortium and in general the improvement of both the response times and the quality of the operations and, above all, post-distribution monitoring, a phase that must definitely be improved to guarantee optimized aid.

The level of **complementarity between the Consortium partners** is potentially adequate (with some duplications in sectoral competences and capacities, as well as in geographical coverage) but in practice is indeed modest. Although multisectorality is a fact in most operations, relatively few rights holders have benefited from a full and truly comprehensive care route of all the needs they experienced, a deficit that has been more pressing in communities with multiple affectations and complex needs.

Regarding the **external articulation** of the MIRE, the permanent dialogue between the MIRE and the OCHA structure (with special emphasis on the local level around the **ELCs**, but also on the sectoral clusters and the GTMI at the national level) and the continuous exchange of information and articulation for the operation with the local authorities, has so far ensured good complementarity and reasonable alignment of the Consortium and its operation with the needs and priorities of the humanitarian agenda. From institutions outside the Consortium, the MIRE is demanding additional efforts in three planes: a greater availability of the information it collects to feed external actors; greater coordination with OCHA and UARIV at the national level in sharing activation decisions and Response Plans; and greater flexibility in responding not only to emergencies arising from armed violence but to disaster situations in remote areas that exceed the capabilities of the SNGRD.

In terms of **impact**, the people and communities that have been consulted during the evaluation exercise manifest a degree of satisfaction between medium and very high regarding the impact of the operations in improving their state of need and in alleviating their suffering, redoubled by the protective effect by the presence that they believe the intervention of the Consortium provides them. Despite the conscious and visible efforts gradually made in the adaptation of the goods and services provided, there is still broad room for improvement in the adaptation of transversal approaches to the differential facts existing in a very young and ethnic group belonging attended population, as well as perhaps also to a greater extent a work to strengthen the capacities of grassroots organizations in community protection procedures, especially towards people most at risk from violence.

As for **connectivity**, the evaluation team has more doubts than certainties. The elements of connectivity that are observed in MIRE are scarce due to the immediatist nature of the intervention that MIRE deploys, so that the programmatic and geographical bridges between the MIRE and the MIRE Plus process as an impulse towards recovery, are blurred and raise the need to strengthen joint reflection and planning. At the same time, the reality of the underlying needs in communities and regions affected by recurrent or chronic humanitarian crises poses difficulties in proposing intervention schemes that go beyond the emergence character and can build bridges towards recovery and development processes.

Although the institutional recognition of the MIRE is a fact, a great Achilles heel of the process can be found on the subsisting need for a **communication** strategy segmented by differentiated targets and that allows it to find greater echo and potentiate its returns, increasing the visibility of the context and needs. This need is even more pressing since the multiplication of global turbulence can cause in the short, medium and long term a rarefaction of international aid resources towards Colombia.

Finally, it has been highlighted by the evaluation team the moving towards a more effective **impact on the country's public policy frameworks**, using its successful positioning within the humanitarian architecture and the very fact of having the stable political and financial support of a European Union body such as the DG ECHO, as well as the window of visibility offered by an international Consortium with a vocation to serve as a reference.

## 2 List of abbreviations and acronyms

<b>ACAPS</b>	NGO "The Assessment Capacities Project"
<b>ACH</b>	Action Against Hunger
<b>AECID</b>	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
<b>APS</b>	Alliance for Solidarity
<b>CD</b>	Steering Committee
<b>CHS</b>	Core Humanitarian Standard
<b>CJT</b>	Transitional Justice Committee
<b>ECHO</b>	Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid of the European Commission
<b>EGI</b>	Information Management Team
<b>EHP</b>	Humanitarian Country Team
<b>ELC</b>	Local Coordination Team
<b>ERN</b>	Rapid Needs Assessment
<b>ESE</b>	State Social Enterprise
<b>FUPAD</b>	Pan American Development Foundation
<b>GANE</b>	Non-State Armed Actor
<b>GTMI</b>	Information Management Thematic Group
<b>HRP</b>	Humanitarian Response Plan
<b>ICBF</b>	Colombian Institute of Family Welfare
<b>ICLA</b>	Information, Counselling and Legal Advice
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IHL</b>	International Humanitarian Law
<b>INEE</b>	Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies
<b>IPS</b>	Health Service Provider Institution
<b>JEP</b>	Special Jurisdiction for Peace
<b>LPA</b>	List of Attended People
<b>MDM</b>	Doctors of the World
<b>MIRE</b>	Intersectoral Emergency Response Mechanism
<b>MQR</b>	Complaints and Grievances Mechanism
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>NNAJ</b>	Girls, boys, adolescents and young people
<b>NRC</b>	Norwegian Refugee Council
<b>OPS</b>	Pan American Health Organization
<b>PcD</b>	Person with disabilities
<b>PDET</b>	Development Program with a Territorial Focus
<b>PDM</b>	Post-distribution monitoring
<b>PR</b>	People at Risk
<b>PUA</b>	Unique People Served
<b>RUV</b>	Central Register of Victims
<b>SAN</b>	Food Security and Nutrition
<b>SGBV</b>	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
<b>SNARIV</b>	National System of Comprehensive Care and Reparation for Victims
<b>SNGRD</b>	National Disaster Risk Management System
<b>SSR</b>	Sexual and Reproductive Health
<b>UARIV</b>	Comprehensive Care and Reparation Unit for Victims
<b>UGC</b>	Consortium Management Unit
<b>UGI</b>	Information Management Unit
<b>UNGRD</b>	National Unit for Disaster Risk Management
<b>URR</b>	Rapid Response Unit
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

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## 3 Introduction

### 3.1 Historical context of evolution

It is part of a diagnosis shared by all the sources consulted during this evaluation process that the post-signing context of the Peace Agreement between the Government and the FARC-EP was decisive in the modification of the intervention strategy of the humanitarian community in Colombia and, as a result of this, in the emergence and conformation of the MIRE process. In the period 2017-2019, all the energy, attention, and resources of the humanitarian community were reduced to a minimum (ECHO's budget at that time fell to an amount lower than the current MIRE). OCHA minimized its activity. MDM considered closing the Colombia Mission (opened in 1987). In mid-2018 it began to be seen that in some territories the construction of peace was going to be a remnant challenge due to the reconfiguration of the armed groups, and in the following months this reality of violence was unfortunately consolidating and spreading.

Taking into account the structural constraints posed by a drastic reduction in the total volume of humanitarian aid, the escalation of the conflict and the emergence of new actors and types of violence and taking advantage of the positive experience in the coordination of joint interventions to respond to emergencies, with the aim of providing a national, multisectoral and comprehensive response, the MAPA and NRC-DKH consortia decided to unite into a single consortium.

The first MIRE consortium (MIRE I) was a formal initiative of the Norwegian Refugee Council-NRC in partnership with 5 other humanitarian organizations (Alliance for Solidarity (APS), Plan Foundation (PLAN), Médecins du Monde France (MDM), Action Against Hunger (ACH) and Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH) with their two national allies as operators (non-partners): Corporación Infancia y Desarrollo (LA CID) and Tierra de Paz (TdP). It was formed not only as a merely technical bet for the gain of effectiveness and operational efficiency (multi-agency and multisectorality), but above all as a political-strategic bet to:

- 1) Make the persistence of the conflict visible despite the peace process
- 2) Maintain ECHO's presence in the country both as an international institutional presence and in terms of the funding needed to sustain aid
- 3) Increase the cost-efficiency and aggregate impact of aid channeled through partners

Therefore, MIRE was largely the result of a willingness to advocate on the part of some of the humanitarian NGOs present in the areas most affected by the conflict, and which obtained the support of ECHO.

The operation of MIRE I was marked by the irruption of the global health crisis caused by Covid-19, declared a pandemic just at the dawn of the start of the first project approved by ECHO. This first phase of the journey did not have an independent external evaluation, but from the review of the documentary information provided we extract that the Consortium responded to a total of 73 emergencies (46 of them derived from the armed conflict, 23 due to Covid-19 and 4 due to disasters caused by natural threats) reaching in total more than 65,000 people (of which 48,000 characterized as victims of organized armed violence).



### 3.2 Summary sheet of the evaluation process


<b>Project Title</b>	"Protection and humanitarian assistance to recently displaced persons and confined communities in Colombia" – MIRE II.
<b>Type of Evaluation</b>	Real-time, External, Independent.
<b>Temporal Scope</b>	01 April 2020 to March 2022.
<b>Geographic Reach</b>	The whole territory with 12 Departments.
<b>Convening Agents</b>	NRC.
<b>Executing agents</b>	Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Action Against Hunger (ACH), Alliance for Solidarity (APS), Médecins du Monde France (Mdm) and ACAPS.
<b>Funding agents</b>	DG ECHO – EU.
<b>General Objective of the project</b>	Giving response, in an intersectoral manner, with a differential approach, to improve access to protection and self-protection mechanisms, temporary shelter solutions, water, sanitation and hygiene, food assistance, physical and mental health care, economic support in emergencies of a humanitarian nature, or because of the armed conflict; in addition to support in the attention of the Covid-19 pandemic.
<b>General objective of the evaluation</b>	Performing a real-time external evaluation of the MIRE to identify the impact of the action developed by the consortium. Documenting lessons and obtaining recommendations, based on evidence-based findings and conclusions.
<b>Specific objectives</b>	<p>SO1: Determining the impact of the MIRE response in terms of: comprehensiveness and complementarity, participation of beneficiaries, timeliness and quality of the carried out actions, cost-effectiveness and incidence in the short and medium term.</p> <p>SO2: Establishing how the MIRE contributes to generating visibility of the victims of the armed conflict that favours promoting the beginning of the route of attention in the victim population served by the consortium, by the National System of Comprehensive Care and Reparation for Victims (SNARIV) or by the Humanitarian Architecture.</p> <p>SO3: Carrying out a sectoral and intersectoral analysis identifying the quality of the needs assessment, the coherence between the need assessment and the response, the relevance of the carried-out actions and the duration of the response.</p>
<b>Evaluation Approaches</b>	Logical Framework Approach, Results Mapping, Contribution Analysis and Case Study.
<b>Levels of analysis</b>	<b>Structure</b> (Operational Structure and Coordination Mechanisms), <b>Design</b> (Identification, Formulation and Appropriation), <b>Processes</b> (Management, Monitoring and Evaluation) and <b>Results</b> (Performance and Impact of supported Interventions)
<b>Prioritized Criteria (ToR)</b>	Integrity, Opportunity/quality, Cost-efficiency, Participation, Advocacy, Alignment, Complementarity, Connectivity-Sustainability. Cross-cutting approaches: gender, age, ethnic-sensitive, different capacities.

## 4 Methodology

The Methodological Report (**Annex 2**) justifies and explains in detail the tools, sources, methodological choices and decisions on the use and exploitation of the evaluative information collected by the evaluation team, either primarily or based on secondary sources that have been operated during the evaluation process in all its phases (cabinet, consultations and analysis). It also realizes the encountered limitations that have been decisive for the effective scope of the evaluation.

Below, we present a synthesis of the used methodology.

### Summary of evaluative performance



### Main positive and conditioning aspects of the evaluation process


- Excellent availability and response times to requirements of UGC staff and technical staff
- Excellent accompaniment by UGC staff on missions
- Very good availability of external actors (government institutions and organizations and non-governmental organizations)
- Good availability of community actors, with understandable misgivings and fatigue
- Availability to access additional financial resources to cover activities and costs not initially foreseen

- Huge volume of actors and information
- Detailed information by actors/components not available from the start
- Information on goal progress sometimes inconsistent
- Very tight times to prepare evaluation missions and to develop tools with full methodological solvency and optimal use
- Minor health conditions in our field team and some security difficulties
- Due to the lack of specialized personnel or insufficient time and resources, the EiE sector cannot be rigorously evaluated.

### General approach

The IECAH team has tried to recover in its extensive consultation process as many authoritative voices as possible that could shed light on the evolution, performance and prospects of the MIRE. To do this, we have tried to integrate the following assessments into our gaze:

## Holistic view of the evaluated project



## Programming cycle perspective

	Block 1. Evaluative review	Block 2. Assessment of mid-term progress	Block 3. Real-time evaluation
Object	MIRE I period April 2020-March 2021	MIRE II period April - November 2021	MIRE II immediate response to current alert (dates to be determined between January and February 2022)
Evaluative priority	☆	☆☆	☆☆☆
Prioritized tools	Documentary analysis Interviews	Documentary analysis Interviews and questionnaires Focus groups Evaluation Group Visit to closed operation and operation in progress	Documentary analysis Interviews Questionnaires and Focus Groups Evaluation Group Visit to ongoing operation Visit to ERN Mission

## Sectoral perspective

As noted above, the Evaluation Team has managed to make a sufficient evaluative approach in 6 of the 7 Results expected by the MIRE, having been Result 2 analyzed tangentially and transversally to the rest of the analyzed sectors.


Results	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7
Sectors	Protection	Education	Shelter	WASH	SAN	Health	Info&Com
Partners	NRC-APS	NRC	NRC	APS	ACH	MdM	NRC/ACAPS

## Multi-criteria perspective

Regarding the evaluation criteria, both those recommended by the Core Humanitarian Standard and those defined by the ToR of the evaluation have been followed. For the purposes of their better dissemination and standardization, we have systematized them under the denominations as follows:



### Specific approaches and used tools



As part of the methodology for this evaluation, it has been oriented to meet the 3 objectives foreseen in the ToR of the evaluation and in particular, to attend to what we always consider in our work as **structuring elements** of any evaluation process: levels, dimensions and criteria (previously described).

In the evaluation process, the use of **qualitative and quantitative analysis tools** has been combined within the information obtained from primary and secondary sources, with special emphasis on qualitative ones, as suggested in the ToR. In the following section and in each finding, the methodological **tools** (their type and number) are indicated, which have been effectively implemented **in the fieldwork phase of the evaluation in the 3 areas that were designated for the evaluation.**

## 5 Findings

**5.1 Do the Project and the Consortium as they have been designed effectively respond to the country-needs in terms of attention to humanitarian crises and have an added value within humanitarian action?**

Indicator
Level of alignment of the Objectives and the Intervention Strategy with the needs of the country expressed in its policy documents and context analysis reports.
Tools
Documentary analysis

The year of transition from MIRE I to MIRE II, 2021, became the year with the worst figures of violence in Colombia since the signing of peace with the FARC-EP. There was the highest homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in Colombia since 2013, with more than 13,000, according to Colombia's Defense Ministry;

likewise, there were the largest number of massacres (93), that is, violent acts in which at least three people die, massive forced displacements (146), fighting between public forces and illegal armed groups (228), harassment of the public force (134) and cases of forced recruitment of minors (89), as revealed by the Investigation and Accusation Unit (UIA) of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). To all this critical scenario, the persistent reality of the flow of migrants, transmigrants and refugees from Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba and South America has been added as well as the multidimensional incidence of Covid-19. In the Global Humanitarian Overview of OCHA, Colombia appeared at the end of 2021 as the country number 23 in the ranking of greater humanitarian needs detected, with an evolution in just 3 years from 5.1 million to 7.2 million people in need of assistance and protection. Likewise, in the INFORM Index on severity of humanitarian crises carried out among others by ACAPS, Colombia has been climbing positions in the ranking since 2020, going from a "high" to a "very high" level in 2021.

The current contextual relevance of emergency humanitarian aid such as that provided by MIRE has only increased in 2022. According to Indepaz, in the first 45 days of the year alone, at least 22 social leaders and human rights defenders have been killed, in addition to three former FARC-EP combatants, signatories of the Peace Accords; In addition, in this same period there are 19 massacres that occurred in just a month and a half of the year, adding 82 fatalities.

In a context as changing as that which has occurred after the Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP, the existence of an **impartial, neutral and independent response is the only guarantee of emergency humanitarian action** worthy of the name. And the fact that it is an international mechanism contributes to that. Therefore, in our opinion, **MIRE comes to fill a gap in the instruments of the Colombian humanitarian architecture and to complement it.**

Indicator
Added values of the MIRE and internal and external complementarity.
Tools
Documentary analysis, Surveys and Questionnaires to management and technical personnel and external actors associated with the intervention

Starting with the evaluative (quantitative) trend of those who make up the interviewed **Steering and Technical Committees of the Consortium**, but also adding to this the vision of the external actors, we can infer the following findings:

- More than in inter-agency and inter-sectorality, which are achieved without the need for consortium forms of management thanks to the functioning of the humanitarian architecture in its territorial dimension (ELC) and the operation of the Response Route articulated on compliance with Law 1448, the MIRE is unique in its character as MIRE, although there was already a URR (germ of the MIRE) within NRC and of which, in a certain way, the MIRE is an amplification.
- The Consortium has represented in general terms a positive process for all parties and for the better articulation, complementarity and aggregate impact of their contributions and expertise.
- In addition, it has been a space for the exchange of good practices and expertise that has allowed on the one hand cross-learning that has been beneficial for some partners (for example, transfers of procedures and expertise in the Protection sector between NRC and APS, or in the WASH and WASH-IPC sector from ACH to APS), but also a shared learning that today makes up the pool of consortium practices (important contribution to the "MIRE brand" as a differentiator from other humanitarian aid offers element)

From the outside, the Consortium is today seen as a referential mechanism and has acquired its own positioning and even empowerment thanks to a double legitimacy: for the good reputation treasured by the donor and each of the partners and for the results in terms of effective coverage of gaps in assistance to the population victim of armed violence, SGBV and threats and deprived of vital minimums. But it stands



out above all how the Consortium contributes to **reducing the complexity of the mesh of humanitarian actors within the humanitarian architecture in Colombia** (a mesh that has more than 45 actors).

Specifically, from **OCHA** and as expressed by its leadership in Colombia to this evaluation team, the MIRE is an essential element of the current humanitarian architecture in Colombia, critical in the current panorama of needs of the country and defunding of most of the partners of the Humanitarian Country Team. It represents the last responding link in the response route provided for in Law 1448 for those emergencies for which its participation is requested due to the overflow of local capacities, that is, of the municipal contingency plans, of the capacities of the central administration (UARIV and **SNARIV**) and of the Local Coordination Teams (ELC). From its role as an articulator of the international humanitarian response, OCHA **especially values**:

- The **complementarity** that ensures the MIRE as a response of "last resort" for mass emergencies and that overwhelm the effective capacities of the first and second responders (law 1448)
- Its excellent **response times**, an aspect that despite being considered insufficient by some of the fundamental actors of the MIRE itself, places it as the fundamental priority, for OCHA it is a clear added value of the MIRE response compared to the responses of other humanitarian actors (ELC) and of course of the State. An illustrative case was the emergency in San Andrés de Tumaco, where the MIRE was able to enter at the first moment and before the ELC.
- Its **flexibility** to eventually attend at the express request of OCHA emergencies derived from disasters with massive impacts and in remote areas. Here the capabilities of the MIRE to "reach where others do not reach" are recognized thanks to the mobilization of its Mobile Team and the availability of resources. This has been the case in emergencies such as those in Amazonas and in Guaviare, where in addition to attending populations in need of help, victimizing events related to armed violence could be detected in parallel. An illustrative case here is the intervention in La Chorrera (Amazonas), which made it possible to identify and make visible community risks related to GANE (Non-State Armed Actor).
- Its **inclusivity**, that is, the non-discrimination based on national origin that exists in its criteria to attend to people in need of help and protection (e.g., attention to people belonging to mixed migratory flows)
- Its **intersectorality**, which makes its activation in complex emergencies especially relevant, and also facilitates the articulating work of the ELCs, which, in case of requesting the MIRE contest, considerably reduces the frictional costs that result from conventional multi-agency operations.
- The **permanent dialogue** between the MIRE and OCHA (with special emphasis on the local level around the ELCs, but also in the sectoral clusters and in the GTMI at the national level) and the permanent exchange of information and articulation for the operation, factors that will be addressed later in this report but that ensure that the action of the MIRE responds to a reality commonly identified and analyzed by the Humanitarian community at all times.

Indicator
Limitations found in the design and evolution of the MIRE.
Tools
Documentary analysis. Surveys and questionnaires to management and technical personnel and external actors associated with the intervention

Some factors that can be highlighted as **limitations** in the type of response currently offered by the MIRE, always within the framework of the level of relevance addressed in this section:

- The **speed of the response** - an aspect that is emphasized as an added value as we previously collected - can compromise due respect for the response route imposed by Law 1448 and that places the State as the first natural respondent in its role as holder of obligations. It has been the case that some municipalities in which emergencies have occurred have not been able to implement their Contingency Plans and the consequent mobilization of funds destined for this purpose. This fact has a

clear impact on the subrogation of the duties of the State by international aid that does not benefit the institutional and financial sustainability of humanitarian aid (this is what is meant by "fungibility" of aid).

- The **model of implementation and deployment of the MIRE** may be very effective and practically irreplaceable for specific emergencies that occur in remote and difficult to access places, but its **clearly more centralized nature** (especially due to the changes from MIRE I to MIRE II) has been able to reduce cost-effectiveness and speed of the response in areas characterized by recurrent and chronic emergencies, except in the operational structures of MDM and NRC that maintain rapid response teams in Cauca and Chocó respectively. At this point, there could be a problem of decoupling between the typology and characterization of humanitarian needs in the country and the model towards which the Consortium has been evolving with the empowerment of its mobile teams (mostly displaced from Bogotá) to the detriment of the operations deployed from the regional offices.
- The evaluation team has been able to identify in the evolution of the MIRE a **tendency to replicate the applied Response Mechanism**, for example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This has relevance for both the present and the future of the MIRE, since in case of losing sight of the typology and characterization of humanitarian crises in Colombia, there is a more or less conscious risk of importing into the reality of the country some emergency response approaches designed for other contexts.

## 5.2 Does the governance structure of the Consortium in its design adequately guarantee the mobilization of the specific capacities of its partners, coordination among them, intersectoral articulation and value addition to operations (with respect to the simple sum of interventions)?

Indicator
Limitations found in the design and evolution of the MIRE.
Tools
Documentary analysis; Interviews with managerial and technical personnel and external actors associated with the intervention

The governance structure of the MIRE is naturally conditioned by its historical process of formation. Like any free association agreement, the MIRE Consortium is first and foremost the expression of a shared will to pool a series of resources, tools and processes in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of separate actions. The scarcity of international financial resources for humanitarian aid that occurred in the Post-Peace Agreement government-FARC-EP scenario, without a doubt, was a decisive component in the historical formation of this and other consortia, in a logic of "making virtue of necessity", as a historical actor declared in an in-depth interview. At the same time, the good and close relations between the Heads of Country Office of several of the partners and the fact that there were two consortia (MAPA and Orange) carrying out sectoral and geographically compatible work undoubtedly contributed to the basic conditions that led to the joint proposal. Finally, partners from both consortia had had experiences with the ECHO donor, an aspect that was decisive in generating trust in facilitating negotiations with the donor and advancing in the agreements of understanding and in the derivation of these in a project.

A central issue for this evaluation exercise is to review how decisions were formally foreseen to be taken within the Consortium, how this governing process has actually developed and of course to assess with what effective performance (achievements) and at what cost (limits) it has occurred.

Any process of partnership between entities is always marked by a tension between two polarities, which is summarized in the following question: once a common framework of intervention and a series of competency and programmatic commitments have been agreed, how far are the partners willing to surrender decisional sovereignty?

The result of this **tension between the preservation of the decisional autonomy of the partners (decisional inter-institutionalism) and the trend towards binding common decision-making (decisional supra-institutionalism)** is currently inconclusive in the MIRE Consortium. On the one hand, the representatives of the partners within the Steering Committee declare a willingness to advance in the consolidation of the Consortium as a decisional unit and point to it as an ideal that would allow achieving the greatest efficiency and agility in the mission of the MIRE, but on the other hand they face the reality of their different interests (dissimilarity of needs and strategic objectives, sectors of specialization and priorities of intervention) and effective capacities (asymmetric also, both in the availability of infrastructure and equipment and geographical coverage), both factors exceeding in all cases the strict MIRE framework.

Likewise, in this tension between decisional polarities, it is necessary to take into account that **the diversity of the partners is one of the added values of the MIRE II** (as of any other Consortium) **and the key that explains its intrinsic richness** (beneficial sectoral specialization for all its operations, knowledge exchange, best practices and positive feedback rich in cross-learning for the improvement cycle of each partner, etc. ) and also its resilience as an entity, since in the face of any impediment that may arise to one of its parts, the fact of strict operational non-centralization gives the MIRE a capacity for resilience and overcoming internal crises that it would not have in case of having a monolithic intervention structure, neither a completely consorted one.

Indicator
Assessment of the official staff linked to the interventions of the Consortium
Tools
Interviews and questionnaires with external actors associated with the Consortium (2)

Unanimously, **all the consulted external actors to the Consortium find a high relevance in the mission, objectives, results and activities of the Consortium.** The formation of the MIRE has meant, both for the Colombian State and for the humanitarian architecture in the country, an experience of positive articulation not only in terms of what it means as a strengthening and facilitation of the articulation between actors, but as a learning and model to move towards humanitarian aid of higher quality and added efficiency. From "its outside" and as **the only inter-institutional mechanism defined as such in the country, the MIRE is seen as a nursery of good practices that has occupied a substantive place in the response to the protection and assistance needs of the most vulnerable populations, especially at the local-operational level and not so much at the state level.**

Indicator
Assessment of the management and technical staff of the project
Tools
Interviews with management and technical staff of the Consortium (E1), Evaluation Group, Questionnaire with management staff of the Consortium (1-A)

Equally unanimously, all the people included in the consulted management of the Consortium find **a high relevance in the mission, objectives, results and activities of the Consortium, only nuanced by the desire expressed by all the interviewees to "do more, in more places, with greater cost-efficiency, higher quality and with greater impacts".**



### 5.3 What changes have taken place in the Consortium since its first phase and in what sense have lessons learned and good practices been integrated into the design and formulation of the second phase?

Indicator
Comparison between documentation and discourse of participating partners between governance and management structures, intervention strategies and logics, sectors, procedures, goals and indicators
Tools
Documentary analysis; Interviews with managerial and technical staff

The most notorious factor in the transition between the first and second phases of the MIRE process was, without a doubt, the reduction in the number of partners, which was a decision mainly promoted by the donor but which enjoyed echo and majority acceptance among the partners, justified in the need to

- 1) Having a lighter and more executive decision-making structure, reducing the transactional costs derived from a concertation with 8 actors
- 2) Reducing the Consortium's aggregate support costs
- 3) Tending to an optimization of skills and resources to increase efficiency and reducing geographical and thematic duplications: "do more with less"

In addition to this decisive change at the level of the governance structure, in the following table we collect other substantial modifications in the rest of the management levels of the Consortium

	MIRE I	MIRE II	MIRE III
<b>Partners</b>	6 foreign operational partners: Action Against Hunger (ACH), Alliance for Solidarity (APS), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Plan Foundation (PLAN), Doctors of the World France (MDM), and Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH) + 2 national NGOs:	<b>Reduction of 2 international and 2 national partners, and 1 international partner added:</b>  4 operational ACH, APS, NRC, MDM) + 1 analysis NGO (ACAPS)	Maintenance of MIRE II partners:  4 operational (ACH, APS, NRC, MDM) + 1 analysis NGO (ACAPS)
<b>Donors</b>	ECHO	ECHO	ECHO + AECID
<b>Financing</b>	3.5 million	3.5 million	3.3 million
<b>Mission</b>	Filling gaps in attention to the population that is victimized by acts of armed violence (and punctually by disasters) in the first (acute) phase of the emergency from an intersectoral approach		+ <b>Mitigating the effects of recurring emergencies</b>
<b>Components/Sectors</b>	5 sectors nominally: WASH/WASH IPC, HEALTH, SAN, SHELTER, Protection (ICLA, EiE, Cash, GBV)	- 6 sectors nominally (EiE comes out of the Protection umbrella).  - Cash is transversed to Protection, SAN and Shelter  - <b>Early childhood</b> care component disappears with the departure of Plan International	The sectors do not vary, but a <b>multipurpose cash basket is added as a mode of operation</b>

		- <b>MQR</b> is left without sole responsibility with the departure of <b>Diakonie</b> and it is agreed that it is each partner who manages its mechanism	
<b>Type of emergencies and prioritized beneficiaries</b>	Victim of mass displacement population, mobility restriction, Confinement, Risk and mitigation of pandemic C19 (in a timely manner, disaster victim population)		Activities aimed at mitigating Covid-19 impacts disappear
<b>Prioritized geographic areas</b>	Antioquia, Cauca, Chocó, Córdoba, Guaviare and Nariño	Antioquia, <b>Cauca</b> , Nariño and Chocó	+ <b>Guaviare and Meta</b>
<b>Governance structure and coordination</b>	Invariable: Steering Committee, Technical Operational Committee, Operational Coordination (UGC). Organs are maintained with the exception of the position of Manager of the UGC that acquires for MIRE III the role of <b>Chief of Party</b> (Manager with reinforced decision-making capacities in the operational field). There is a problem that remains in the three functional organizational charts: specific functions are defined for each organ, but the hierarchical-functional flows between them are not delimited and there are decisional gaps.		
<b>Consortium Management Unit - UGC</b>	Minimum structure: Management, Coord. Operational, M&E Coord, Coord. Financial. During the course of the phase, logistics officer and M&E Technical Assistant are included.	Extended structure: Management, Technical Officer. Operative, Security Officer, Logistics Assistant, M&E Coord. and M&E Technical Assistant and Finance Technical Officer. The changes in the charges occur after an analysis of budget reduction and adjustment to the model established in MIRE I.	The MIRE II structure is expanded with 2 cash technicians and 1 Technical Assistant in MQR
<b>Support processes</b>	-Incidence  -Communication (Standard Visibility, only at Colombia level),  -Monitoring and Evaluation (including MQR),	-The <b>incidence</b> component (donor position) falls.  - <b>Security and Logistics</b> are added as workflows in the UGC in an explicit and organic way.  -Communication/ opens up to a <b>European/international target (Above of Standard)</b> .  -The organic invisibility of the Information Management component (always assumed by ACH, although functionally dependent on the UGC) is maintained, although not its effective production, which is increased.	The UGC team (although from NRC) is joined by a person in charge of the management of multipurpose Cash.  (In addition, NRC will make two other professionals available to manage Cash, but with its own resources).
<b>Operational model</b>	Mobile team, high decentralization with 6 Territorial Links: Nariño (PLAN), Chocó (NRC), Valle del Cauca (APS), Córdoba (ACH), Norte Santander (NRC) and Meta-Guaviare (MDM)	<b>Greater centralization.</b> Although MDM and NRC do keep their mobile teams decentralized to cover the Pacific Region with more recurrent emergencies, the territorial links lose operational weight and are renamed as <b>Territorial Referents</b>	
<b>Activation criteria</b>	-Difficult accessibility,  - Competency capacity partners,  -Multisectorality (minimum two partners),	The previous ones are maintained, but change:  - <b>Minimum volume: 50 families, 100 people</b>	

	-Minimum population volume affected: 10 families or 50 people; -Availability of mobile equipment and funds; -Security	<b>- Multisectorality: there is already a tendency in the SO to promote the minimum competition of 3 sectors</b>	
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# 1. 5.4 Does the Project and the Consortium as designed present a clear, solid and coherent intervention logic?

Indicator
4.1 Level of coherence of the logical framework's horizontal and vertical logic (judgment of the evaluation team)
Tools
Documentary analysis; Interviews with management and technical staff

The logical framework of the MIRE II Project has sought to structure the commitment to a vocationally integral operation of the Consortium, and to do so in a legible, coherent and traceable way, with the added challenge of doing so from institutions with institutional philosophies and methodologies, competencies, responsibilities, geographical coverage and very dissimilar operation sizes and resources, but also on concurrent occasions. We find in a general way and as we have already pointed out, that the external coherence of the MIRE is complete as an Emergency Response Mechanism with an action limited to the first or acute phase of it (see Main Objective, below).

## General structure of objectives and results (vertical logic)

In an analysis focused on the formulation technique, we find a vertical logic of intervention that is based on two objectives (Main and Specific):

<b>Main Objective:</b>	Ensuring that the unmet urgent humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable populations affected by displacement or mobility/confinement restrictions in Colombia are met during the early stages of the emergency.
<b>Specific Objective 1</b>	Improving access to humanitarian assistance and protection mechanisms and preventing further damage among communities affected by displacement and the restriction/confinement of mobility in Colombia.

On this mandate, the formulation builds in its vertical logic 6 results linked to each sector (Protection, Education in Emergencies, Shelter, Wash, Food Security and Health) and a result 7 not linked to assistance.

In the upper "strategic" segment of the intervention logic of MIRE II (Objectives) we find a first problem of formal coherence, derived from the use of the verb "Ensuring" in the Main Objective, where it should, in our opinion, in any case say "Contributing" since in the Specific Objective it is made clear that the vocation of the MIRE is to *facilitate* access to humanitarian aid, that is, serving as part of and/or complement in case of gaps in effective assistance by the State and other actors operating in the area. Regarding the Specific Objective, the nuance ceases to be formal and now entails an aspect of incoherence, in the sense that the use of the expression "Improving access" instead of "Providing care" has fundamental implications: the stricto sensu consideration of the Specific Objective as it is formulated, leads us to imagine an Emergency

Response Mechanism more focused on solving the articulation and connectivity in the aid between actors and processes and to work on aspects of advocacy in public policies, as well as an effort aimed at negotiating with armed actors and building peace (structural or basic conditions for effective access to humanitarian assistance) and not much less to a Mechanism entirely focused on the operation such as the MIRE.

In the lower segment of the vertical logic of intervention we have, as we have already pointed out, a logic consistent with the vocation of integrality of the MIRE and with its adaptation and alignment with the framework of humanitarian aid formally established in Colombia. However, we found several specific problems:

- **Outcome 1:** The result is expressed in terms of "improved access", but this factor is unverifiable without a baseline and then is not consistent with the indicators or available sources of verification. In addition and more importantly, the concept of protection that underlies this formulation and that is then ratified at the level of the indicators is quite poor, assigning the MIRE a function practically as a channeler of victimized persons to the UARIV for registration in the RUV and thus limiting the protection to a registry that allows a recognition that in practice does not provide effective protection solutions, timely, effective and sufficiently durable for people affected by the armed conflict. .
- **Result 2:** at the formal level, it restricts in its formulation to its target population the NNAJ, when in the operational and financial reality the greatest effort is made with the educational personnel. In addition, Education in Emergencies restricts its contents here too with respect to all the dimensions collected by INEE, excluding in a special way the dimension of work in Educational Policy.
- **Result 7:** in principle, this result is presented as transversal or adjuvant to the whole intervention, although in practice we will see that very few of its indicators really serve the operation, because the scale of analysis (mainly departmental) is not the scale of operation of the MIRE (community, village, neighbourhood) and because the ACAPS care centers are located in matters of context, security and access, rather than in specific needs and possibilities of help in the different sectors. More than serving the operations, in fact and as we will see later in the section dedicated to the analysis of the Results, the work of ACAPS is nourished by the information produced before and during the MIRE operations. In any case and at a more formal level, what has been called "Coordination" (probably in response to the structuring in clusters of the EHP) in its contents has little or nothing to do with the coordination function, but rather with aspects related to humanitarian analysis and the visibility of the situation in the country abroad. In addition, analysis products are mixed in this catch-all with communication products, which implies mixing two types of flow in a single result: products with clear added value (ACAPS) with typically support products (public dissemination of the consortium's actions). In general, the justification for the indicators related to communication and visibility and their goals is not clear, which does not mean at all that the analysis and communication products for this Result are not relevant and useful.

### Structure of indicators and targets



The logical framework of MIRE II presents a battery of 24 indicators (2 of Objective and 22 of Results) that serve as the basis for a total of 30 goals (2 goals of objective, 6 of result or component and 22 of sub-component).

We have on the one hand two indicators for each objective (GO and SO) that are expressed in rate (%) with respect to an absolute value (number of attended people). These two general indicators already introduce us to two qualifications in the operation pursued by the MIRE: by type of victim (the specifically beneficiaries will be victims of acts of displacement and / or confinement and of restrictions on mobility derived from armed violence) and by nature or type of intervention (% of operations that offer a multisectoral response, that is, with the help of 3 or more sectors).

We find in general terms that **the battery of indicators is poor, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, in relation to both what the MIRE should measure in its activities and processes, and what the MIRE does effectively and does not show, due to the fact of its invisibility or non-inclusion in this logical**

**framework.** There are, for all sectors of intervention, batteries of standardized indicators in international practice, some of which would substantially enrich the basic formulation of the MIRE. In the chapter dedicated to Recommendations we collect some suggestions, as well as in the annexes corresponding to the sectoral reports, where examples are offered, and links are located to sources where you can find a variety of indicators of different types that would complement those chosen by MIRE. All indicators are, in our opinion, output indicators and there is no impact (outcome) or process indicators, which weakens the functionality of the Project Monitoring System and its ability to introduce improvements at different levels of the operation and not only in its most programmatic elements.

Indicator
Assessment of the management and technical staff of the Consortium on the soundness of the Logical Framework
Tools
Questionnaire to directive and technical staff (1-A, questions 3 and 4)



For the Consortium's management and technical staff there has not been a formulation problem, although there is a greater number of skeptics regarding the quality and functionality of the Logical Framework's horizontal logic (indicators, goals, sources of verification and hypotheses).

2. 5.5 Is there an explicit commitment by the Consortium in its formulation and intervention procedures to subject its activity to the commitments of the Core Humanitarian Standard, the Sphere Minimum Standards and the ECHO guidelines?

Indicator
4.1 Level of coherence of the horizontal and vertical logic of the Logical Framework (judgment of the evaluation team)
Tools I
Documentary analysis; Interviews with managerial and technical staff

The details of the assessments on this question are set out exhaustively in Annex 4. In short, while the MIRE project has not been designed in accordance with the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS), nor do partner organizations structure their work accordingly. This framework allows to point out areas of special conformity or deficiencies according to the best practices in the humanitarian sector, also considering the convenience of alignment with the Standard considered by the donor. At the same time, the use, even partial use of CHS in evaluation, makes it possible to address quality issues from a more global perspective and in accordance with internationally assumed standards. The overall assessment is positive, noting that the programming documents and the elements shared in the interviews have implicit or explicit references to the 9 commitments and 9 quality criteria included in the Standard.

The processes that are established to ensure that resources are managed responsibly (Commitment 9) stand out in general, although some considerations about the environmental impact of the responses were missed. Coordination (commitment 6) is also a well-structured point in general with greater consistency in working with other actors (public entities, communities, agencies) compared to internal coordination between the actors of the consortium. Adequacy and relevance (commitment 1), effectiveness and response time (commitment 2), learning (commitment 7) and human resources management (commitment 8) also appeared to be well structured, although with specific elements not aligned with the Standard. Among others: the excessive standardization of identification mechanisms, technical criteria that are not specifically adequate, limitations in sharing learning with affected communities or the lack of strategy to guarantee the well-being of staff.

While the review of all commitments presents improvement routes for the future, **commitments 3, 4 and 5 can be highlighted as areas of particular interest to be reviewed.** These include, respectively, **the strengthening of the local and prevention of negative impacts, the information, participation and feedback of the communities, as well as the guarantee of having effective complaint mechanisms.** In these areas, good practices and intentions were identified, but they raised important questions to minimize damage and ensure the connectivity of the actions, as well as, in general, to guarantee the protagonism of the affected people and their access to a mechanism to give feedback and be able to formulate complaints. The improvement of the MQR flow is being supported by ACH in several aspects and it is presumed that these efforts will be visible in MIRE III.

3. 5.6 Have spaces, mechanisms and indicators been established since the design of the Consortium and the project to allow an exchange of information, coordination, articulation, complementarity and synergies of MIRE interventions with the competent entities of the Colombian State and other national and international actors?

Indicator
Existence of coordination spaces foreseen in the design of the Consortium and the project with the Colombian institutions and other national and international actors in the field of humanitarian aid
Tools
Documentary analysis; Interviews with management and technical staff

Next, we note the aspects of complementarity that we consider most relevant and that we have been able to appreciate in 3 of the 6 operating sectors.



### **Articulation in Protection**

One of the greatest added values found for this component was the great knowledge of the context, of the institutional actors in the territory, and the trust treasured through the work with civil society, and ethnic organizations in the territories by the leading partners in each department, especially by the historical presence of NRC and APS (depending on the offices in each zone). The legitimacy by results achieved by the partners is allowing a quick entry and favouring the actions of the consortium in areas where other institutional actors and the humanitarian community do not manage to access, which infuses the action of the MIRE with a potential for significant and differential permeation with respect to other operations.

As a result, there is evidence of a strong capacity for dialogue and a high degree of articulation of the Consortium at the local level, where the MIRE teams participate in both the ELC and the Transitional Justice Committees, maintain close and continue coordination with the Municipal Liaison of Victims, the Ombudsman's Office and the Personería, and work with the staff of the municipal mayors (especially with the referents of the Secretary of Government, education, health) and with the ESE. Likewise, it has been found that in its actions the MIRE consolidates the networks and organizations of support for the victims with which it interacts, and exchanges information related to cases. Coordination with the ELCs occurs best when the consortium is already known in the area of influence and has generated the trust and relationship required and its actions and objectives are known (Nariño, Chocó). It was evident that it is more complex when it enters a new area, where humanitarian actors are already positioned and organized (Vichada, Arauca). During the accompaniment by the field evaluators in Valle del Cauca, Chocó and Nariño, the consortium's interest in articulating and filling gaps in emergencies, delivering information and avoiding duplication in assistance could be demonstrated.

To a much lesser extent, there is evidence of work with governorates and with institutions at the national level such as the ICBF, UNGRD and other entities that make up the CJT and the SNARIV. Despite the existing agreement with the UARIV and the fact that there are moments of exchange of pre-operational and operational information with the departmental offices of the Unit, the level of contact with the national headquarters of the UARIV has been reduced, an aspect especially notorious taking into account the close coordination relationship that existed with this entity during MIRE I (with practically weekly meetings).

### **Articulation in Food Security and Nutrition (SAN)**

The supply of food packages is provided by numerous sources of both government and international cooperation (mayor's office, governor's office, UARIV, WFP, and FUPAD, and many others). It is important to strengthen at this point the spaces of coordination, articulation and technical and operational feedback, through the SAN cluster, in addition to how it is currently carried out, with the ELC and the Liaison of Victims.

The coordinated and articulated work of the consortium and in this case of ACH with the local authorities, especially the mayor's offices, with the Liaison of Victims and the UARIV and other co-operators, has allowed a staggered and complementary entry of food assistance. Work with the ELC to continue providing assistance with other organizations and to avoid duplication of assistance was also observed. There is evidence of good work with institutions and partner organizations of the ELC, to avoid duplication, and to reach the affected communities with multisectoral responses; more agreements could also be established with international cooperation projects and with (development) programs of institutions (PDET type), to link communities to medium- and long-term programs that can transform critical structural conditions. Advocacy and coordinated work with local entities is key to achieving the expected results. In relation to joint and coordinated work with the Local Coordination Team (ELC), the case of the ELC Nariño should be highlighted, where we saw very good coordination and joint work.

### **Articulation in Health**

In its operations, MDM includes coordination with local authorities, Ministries of Health and IPS (Health Service Provider Institutions) for the rapid assessment of needs and coordination of the response, as well as feedback on the carried-out actions. The timely delivery of information to the ESE to guarantee the


follow-up of the attended cases, as well as the right channeling to the programs (Chronic, sexual and reproductive health, etc.), have been found as still deficient elements: it is found that MDM holds completion meetings, some even virtual, but the delivery of a report of accomplished attention and specific cases that merit follow-up by the health services has not been carried out. It does exist a coordination for the execution of the mobile clinic, in issues such as: referral of cases to the emergency department, report of notification sheets, delivery of antimalarials, and delivery of hospital waste after intervention.

In relation to the rest of the humanitarian community, MDM participates in the Health Cluster actively; lessons have been shared with the other partners, but coordination has not been carried out with other partners, with presence and response in the territory, to articulate or complement the advanced health actions. Partners with similar health responses such as the ICRC, the Colombian Red Cross and the OPS, know in a very general way the health actions of the consortium, but do not refer to specific articulation or coordination for the humanitarian response in health, despite the fact that in some territories there are departmental health tables with the purpose of articulating the response in local health with the response of international cooperation. Surely the lack of intrasectoral articulation between actors is a common factor to all sectoral work spaces in a humanitarian community with such a number of operators, but MIRE should and could proactively contribute to the optimization of these spaces and articulated workflows since it means a lost opportunity in efficiency to cover gaps (attention to cases not covered by health brigades) and to avoid duplication of efforts, freeing up resources in time to achieve greater opportunity and impact in other areas.

Indicator
Perception of external actors on the fit and complementarity of the MIRE in the humanitarian architecture in Colombia
Tools
Documentary analysis; Interviews with management and technical staff

In your opinion, which of the following statements best corresponds to the reality of the Consortium in its FIT IN HUMANITARIAN ARCHITECTURE in Colombia? If you are not satisfied with any of the options, formulate your own in COMMENTS.

Answered: 16 Omitted: 1



Unanimously, the management and technical staff of the Consortium find that MIRE's fit into the humanitarian architecture in Colombia and its complementarity with national and international institutions and organizations is optimal.


ANSWER OPTIONS	ANSWERS
▼ The Consortium adds a SIGNIFICANT AND COMPLEMENTARY value to the capacity of the State to attend to its emergencies, and its action DOES NOT SUBSTITUTE the necessary first response of the obligation holders (Colombian State)	50,00 % 8
▼ The Consortium contributes with a SIGNIFICANT value to the capacity of the State to deal with its emergencies, although ON OCCASIONS IT SUBSTITUTES the necessary first response of the obligation holders	43,75 % 7
▼ The Consortium contributes an ESSENTIAL value to respond to emergencies, to the point where in most cases its operation SUBSTITUTES the necessary first response of the obligation holders	0,00 % 0
▼ The Consortium FAILS TO PROVIDE A SIGNIFICANT VALUE on many occasions since it depends largely on the poor and late first response of the obligation holders	0,00 % 0
▼ I do not have enough valuation elements	6,25 % 1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>



Indicator
Perception of external actors on the fit and complementarity of the MIRE in the humanitarian architecture in Colombia
Tools
Questionnaire 2-A (question 5)

In your opinion, the DESIGN of the MIRE II Consortium has made it possible to COMPLEMENT AND IMPROVE the architecture in Colombia to mitigate the impacts of the conflict and, in general, to improve the aggregate capacity to respond to the emergencies that occurred in the country in the period after the Peace Accords? Comment if you want.

Answered: 15 Omitted: 1



Likewise, a majority of consulted external actors find that MIRE's fit into the humanitarian architecture in Colombia and its complementarity with national and international institutions and organizations is moderate to optimal.

ANSWER OPTIONS	ANSWERS
Highly	46,67 % 7
Satisfactorily	40,00 % 6
Moderately	13,33 % 2
Scarcely	0,00 % 0
I do not have enough valuation elements	0,00 % 0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>15</b>

4. 5.7 Is the general structure (governance and operational) of the Consortium clear and allows a truly comprehensive, agile/timely, effective, efficient, transparent, participatory and perfectible operation? What were and are being the main problems or challenges to overcome? What are the keys to success?

Indicator
Assessment of the management and technical staff of the Consortium on the different factors
Indicator Tools
Documentary analysis; Interviews with management and technical staff; Evaluation Group

Any process of partnership between entities is always characterized by a tension between two polarities, which is summarized in the following question: once a common framework of intervention and a series of competency and programmatic commitments have been agreed, how far are the partners willing to surrender decisional sovereignty?

The result of this tension between the preservation of the decisional autonomy of the partners (decisional inter-institutionalism<sup>1</sup>) and the trend towards the adoption of binding common decisions (decisional supra-

<sup>1</sup> We understand by **inter-institutionalism decisional** that organizational dynamic consisting of contemplating the association as a set of negotiations that are carried out between entities based on their own interests and some common ones on which specific

institutionalism<sup>2</sup>) is today inconclusive in the MIRE Consortium, as revealed by both the interviews with staff of the Steering Committee and the Evaluation Group that brought them together with the members of the Technical Committee and as we pointed out in the chapter dedicated to the Dilemmas of Choice, which we have integrated into the **full Evaluation Report**. On the one hand, the representatives of the partners within the Steering Committee declare a willingness to advance in the consolidation of the Consortium as a decisional unit and point to it as an ideal that would allow achieving the greatest efficiency and agility in the mission of the MIRE, but on the other hand they face the reality of their different interests (dissimilarity of needs and strategic objectives, sectors of specialization and priorities of intervention) and effective capacities (asymmetric also, both in the availability of infrastructure and equipment and geographical coverage), both factors exceeding in all cases the strict MIRE framework: this process represents for all partners between 5 and 20% of their total operating resources and effective workload in Colombia. For the donor, there is no doubt that the ideal would be a total decisional unit, which nullifies the transactional costs of "intergovernmental" decision-making, that is, where the fundamental decisions (activations of the MIRE, modalities of applied aid, distribution of resources, etc.) become a confusing and often inconclusive debate between partners.

Likewise, in this tension between decisional polarities, it is necessary to take into account that **the diversity of the partners is one of the added values of MIRE II (as of any other Consortium) and the key that explains its intrinsic richness** (beneficial sectoral specialization for all its operations, exchange of knowledge, best practices and positive feedback rich in cross-learning for the improvement cycle of each partner, etc) **and also its resilience as an entity**, since in the face of any impediment that may arise to one of its parts, the fact of strict operational non-centralization gives the MIRE a capacity for resilience and overcoming internal crises that it would not have in case of having a monolithic intervention structure, or in case of being completely consorted.

**In practice, the MIRE Consortium has developed since its initial formation (MIRE I) on the basis of an inter-institutional decisional logic** that has been developed from four axes differentiated by both the topological and the temporal spheres:

- **Formal-public and static:** the common basic commitments between partners and donor and between each partner and the donor, collected in the bilateral and multilateral agreement documents and programmatically embodied in the approved Single Form and in the Agreements and Memorandum of Understanding
- **Formal-public and static:** the guidelines that the donor (DG ECHO) has made to all the partners as part of its monitoring and evaluation of the performance of the Consortium in its first and second phases, being that these orientations have been modified with the change of the management staff of the European organization in Colombia and with the prioritization
- **Formal-public and dynamic:** the dynamic orientations that the Steering Committee of the Consortium (composed of 1 or 2 representatives of each partner) has been resolving in each of the monthly sessions held in the heat of the execution of its mandate
- **Informal-private and dynamic:** the negotiations that have taken place bilaterally between the donor and each partner; this last section is deducted from the information collected in the interviews and there is no written record of them, but it is not a factor to be dismissed in the modification of the objective conditions of operation and development of the Consortium, since there have been and are evolutions within it that have been recognized

To complete the characterization of the governing structure of the Consortium, it is necessary to highlight some drivers or determinants in its operation:

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agreements and commitments are reached, but each partner always retaining a wide margin of decisional autonomy and a right of veto.

<sup>2</sup> The **supra-institutionalism decisional** is, by contrast, that decisional dynamic by which the associated entities entrust their action to the collective decision, sacrificing their decisional autonomy and their veto capacity and changing it for actions based on the decisional majority or on a unanimous (without possible veto) but abiding in any case by the collective decision.

- **A structurally asymmetric correlation of forces between the partners**, determined by the NRC Coordinating role (role on the other hand assumed as necessary, legitimate and positive by the rest of the partners), by the dissimilar distribution of responsibilities and funds derived from the inter-institutional arrangements that gave rise to the proposal (Single Form), by the dissimilar capacity of supervision and influence of the partners on the work of the UGC (nested in NRC and subject to contractually to its procedures, although missionally at the service of all partners) and finally on the different relationships of each partner with the donor (woven on the basis of historical inter-institutional relations, but also on personal relationships)
- **A high interference of the donor in the strategic** (and collaterally operational) orientation of the Consortium, an aspect that must be considered in its positive and negative effects. On the one hand, the strategic role of the MIRE process for DG ECHO in Colombia, both in terms of the Consortium as a vehicle for the implementation of IHP priorities, but also as a differentiating element at the institutional level (defining a "know-how" with a European brand in humanitarian aid), and in its undoubted benchmarking potential (MIRE as a nursery of good practices replicable in the country and the region, in terms of operation but also in the very management of consortium operations), and this without prejudice to the previous existence of other broader and more ambitious consortia supported by DG ECHO in other regions of the world and within the country.
- The existence within the Consortium of **substantial differences in the concept of humanitarian action and in the criteria, modus operandi and requirements and needs of the partners**, an evident but also decisive aspect in the consistency of the Consortium as a management unit and in the strategic and functional projection of the Mechanism<sup>3</sup>
- The **inertia of competition for visibility and resources** that occur between the partners that, in general terms, always work in a more or less accentuated and visible way in a humanitarian space with a large volume of actors and changing budgetary availability.
- **A timid move towards greater integration within the consortium**, promoted above all by the donor and supported by 4 decisions:
  - o The **multisectorality required** in at least 70% of the interventions (which clearly required decision-making by the partners on their respective decisions to activate or not for the missions), set as the second specific indicator of the project in its logical framework;
  - o The obligation to carry out a **joint entry of the 4 partners** with operational capacity (that is, all except ACAPS) at least for the lifting of the **ERN** (which forces a minimum common involvement of all in all operations);
  - o The introduction in MIRE III of a **Manager with reinforced executive capacities** role (Chief of Party), which would theoretically come to push the commitments regarding the consortium actions, reducing the margin of decisional autonomy of the partners;
  - o The introduction also in MIRE III of **two "communalized" or "communalizable" financial levers**: multipurpose cash (which will be managed by NRC but with a purpose of serving transversally as a financing bag for aid in all sectors) and the inter-sector item of the "crisis modifier" type, consisting of the provision of an item in each component to cover emergencies that could affect other sectors and that could activate "fast-track" mechanisms for justifying reassignments between items to cover the same objective.

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<sup>3</sup> (We delve into this in some of the Dilemmas of Choice in which we have decided to structure the second part of the evaluative findings.)

Below, we collect in a synthetic table the dilemmas faced by the governance structure of the MIRE and that we address in the extensive Evaluation Report in more detail.

Level	Issues to be resolved	Choice dilemmas (option A and B)	
Strategic	<b>1. STRATEGIC DIMENSIONING OF THE MIRE</b>	MIRE as one more mechanism/actor in the humanitarian architecture operation	MIRE as a great Mechanism Response Mechanism reference in Colombia
	<b>2. DEGREE OF DECISIONAL INTEGRATION</b>	Decisional inter-institutionality  (Reinforced current coordination)	Decisional supra-institutionality  (Full membership, collegial and binding decisions taken by majority and/or unanimity)
	<b>3. POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONAL IMPACT</b>	Actions focused on the provision of aid and protection	Expanded actions towards political-institutional advocacy (national level) and capacity building (local level)
Operative	<b>4. PERMANENCE AND CONNECTIVITY</b>	Mechanism focused exclusively on covering emergencies arising from the armed conflict	Integrating mechanism for an aid-development nexus (Prolonged stay in the territories of intervention)
Operative	<b>5. LIMITS ON DIALOGUE WITH ARMED GROUPS FOR ACCESS</b>	Acceptance of the country norm regarding dialogue and dealing with armed non-State actors	Increased capacity for humanitarian negotiation and dialogue, giving priority to the emerging, impartial and neutral nature of aid
	<b>6. TOLERANCE THRESHOLD FOR INSECURITY</b>	Primacy of the safety component in the decision on activation and effective intervention (Average risk tolerance)	Primacy of humanitarian action over activation and effective intervention (High risk tolerance)
	<b>7. RESPONSE TIMES AND QUALITY</b>	Immediacy / Speed in response	Quality and articulation of operations
	<b>8. IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATIONAL MODEL</b>	Centralized operating model  (Mobile team deployed from Bogotá) with the support of territorial links (partner offices)	Operation model with decentralized nodes  (Regional offices) to cover recurrent emergency areas in addition to the Mobile Team
	<b>9. ASSIGNMENTS BUDGET</b>	Budgeting subject to negotiation, linked to proposals, needs and negotiating capacity of each partner	Donor-predetermined budgeting based on humanitarian needs and annual projections
	<b>10. ROLE OF THE MANAGER</b>	UGC with exclusive mandate of consultation and coordination in a fluid decision-making framework  (Always adapted to each emergency and situation)	UGC with command to make autonomous operational decisions within a framework of agreed and mandatory parameterized criteria  (Reduced discretion on the part of the CD)
	<b>11. SIZING OF THE UGC</b>	Lightweight UGC, reduced to the minimum possible	UGC with enhanced operational capabilities

Support	<b>12. COMPREHENSIVENESS OF AID</b>	Multisectorality with specific coordination between sectors	Deep intersectorality and centrality and transsectoriality of the Protection component
	<b>13. MONITORING</b>	Monitoring only focused on the operation and its outputs (fulfillment of logical framework goals)	Comprehensive monitoring of all flows and operations of the Consortium and its evolution and learning processes
	<b>14. INFORMATION PRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT</b>	Information Management Unit focused on the MIRE operation and its outputs	Information Management Unit as a Comprehensive Situational Analysis Unit of Context and Outcomes
	<b>15. COMMUNICATION AD EXTRA</b>	MIRE Marketing Tool	Strategic process for the maximum deployment of the Consortium

## 5.8 What level of efficacy did MIRE I present? What were its main achievements and weaknesses?

Indicator
Level of achieved progress according to LPA database
Tools
Documentary analysis

The exploitation of the information previously presented allows an effectiveness analysis to be carried out on the basis of what is projected as the goals that are established in absolute values in the Logical Framework of the intervention.

### Goals by objective

S01 Indicator	% of beneficiaries (disaggregated by sex, age and disability) who report that humanitarian assistance is provided in a safe, accessible, responsible and participatory manner.	Goal
		70%
S02 indicator	% of beneficiaries receiving assistance from three or more different sectors in response to needs discovered during displacement or restricted mobility/confinement.	60%


At the level of targets set for the Specific Objectives of the MIRE in its second phase we verify the following:

- ✓ In quantitative terms and being the beneficiary population of the project 35,823 (a figure that as we commented does not rest on any baseline document or on any justification explicit in the *Single Form* from some general statistics), the Project would have reached 128% of the universe of projected beneficiaries, which indicates a **high compliance at the scope level**.

- ✓ However, the Project does not present a means of verification that allows measuring the qualitative aspect of the general objective, that is, that 70% of the beneficiaries value the aid received as safe, accessible, responsible and participatory.
- ✓ Regarding SO2 and as explained in the previous section, only 1 in 5 unique attended people benefited from the aid provided by 3 or more sectors. This fact does not necessarily imply a deficit on the part of the project, since it is perfectly possible that a majority of displaced or confined people only had emerging needs in 1 or 2 components. The practical absence of solvent verification mechanisms such as PDM or MQR forms makes it impossible to effectively verify the degree of effective coverage of experienced needs.
- ✓ We observed that on average, **the MIRE II was presenting on January 31, 2022, a level of average compliance with its goals per result of 93.8%, which is highly satisfactory** taking into account what remains to be computed in terms of Attended People in the operations carried out between February and March.
- ✓ At this point too, it has not been possible for the evaluation team to deduct from the available data a measure of real performance by sector of intervention and a comparison between these, since this assessment would have entailed establishing an assessment of the effective effort required by each different type of attention: the amount of man-woman/hour work needed to carry out a collective training or distributing filters for purification or food kits is obviously different from that to attend in medical consultation to people in need of physical or mental care.

Components	UPS	GOAL	% Real progress
ICLA Protection	11764	8400	140,0
NNAJ	11	10	110,0
PR	2059	1500	137,3
GBV	103	90	114,4
<b>Total Protection</b>	<b>13937</b>	<b>15.500</b>	<b>89,9</b>
EiE	6708	8400	79,9
Shelter	9907	8500	116,6
Wash	19976	21500	92,9
WASH-IPC	12182	20000	60,9
<b>WASH Total</b>	<b>32158</b>	<b>31161</b>	<b>103,2</b>
SAN	15928	23080	69,0
Health	6785	12000	56,5
Coordination	7	16	43,8

## Goals by outcome



## 5.9 Has the management of resources (financial and human) been optimal?

Indicator
Level of achieved progress according to LPA database
Tools
Documentary analysis; Interviews and Questionnaires (1A and 1-B) to management and technical staff of the Consortium

### Relationship between types of expense


The ratio of programme costs (i.e. proportion of the total DG ECHO grant funds that are intended to directly finance field operations) and support costs (staff at headquarters and office and other expenses not directly linked to the operations) is reasonable in the overall budgetary framework (77% and 23%, respectively), although it will be necessary to wait for the financial closure of the project (June-July 2022) to check if this relationship was respected in aggregate and by each partner.

The cost of the UGC, which integrates all the consortium functions of the project, represents around 5% of the total cost of the project, which is also perfectly reasonable and, in our opinion, even presents margins of possible expansion: it would be perfectly reasonable to reach 8-9% in this area of expenditure, considering a MIRE III with a higher effective integration process.

### Financial implementation rate by sector

The execution rates by sector until the end of 2021 (after 7 months of effective execution over 10 months of actual execution) were 64%, which is a slight delay, especially conditioned by low executions in Results 7, 1 (ICLA), 3 (Shelter) and 5 (SAN).





### Cost-efficiency analysis

A rigorous and complete cost-efficiency analysis of the Consortium's operations, both at an aggregate level and at levels disaggregated by component, geographical area or operation, has not been possible due to four objective limitations:

1. The financial flow is not consorted but in its consolidation segment for the report to the donor, which means that each partner maintains total discretion over the financial execution and only reports after the implementation;
2. There is no joint and transparent budget planning in a budget plan of operation that accompanies each **Response Plan of a Financial Plan, so a cost-efficiency analysis of each operation is not possible, and this prevents any type of evaluation of this criterion, but also - and this is the most important thing - any effort aimed at improving the aggregate efficiency in the operation of the Consortium;**
3. Our team has not had access to the operational financial information that is detailed by partner as part of the delivered documentary collection, but only to the consolidated financial reports delivered to the donor
4. At the time of writing, financial information is available with a cut-off date of December 31 and information on compliance with indicators (attended people) with a cut at the end of January, so it is impossible to have the update of how much effective resource has been used in each sector to date, and it is not possible to calculate the effective cost of care by sector / person in MIRE II, beyond what is provisionally and prognostically stated in the financial documents of the Project

However, from the obtained information with a cut-off date of December 31, we can infer several findings:



Cost per Beneficiary				
Partner	Result	Execution EUR	No. attended people	Cost €/Beneficiary
NRC	ICLA-NRC	89.661	11308	7,93
APS	GBV, PR, NNA	130.476	1862	70,07
NRC	EiE-NRC	259.005	6028	42,97
NRC	SHELTER-NRC	349.656	9997	34,98
APS	WASH WASH IPC-APS	455.284	20443	22,27
ACH	SAN - ACH	329.999	8463	38,99
MDM	HEALTH - MdM	546.431	7132	76,62
R7: Coordination (ACAPS Part)		38.994	3	12.998,00

- The most obvious - being also the most predictable - is the great asymmetry existing in the unit costs of care between sectors, with differences of 1 to 10 between the least and the most expensive (ICLA vs Health)
- The average cost of MIRE care according to these calculations would be EUR 42 per beneficiary, information which, once validated for MIRE II with consolidated financial and technical data and crossed with the forecast data of needs by sector offered by OCHA, should serve to inform in the formulation of MIRE III both the global goals and the sectoral targets, and the budgetary allocations by sector and by therefore per partner.

Beyond the effects of these limitations on the evaluation exercise itself for a detailed cost-efficiency analysis, the most worrying thing is the effects that this information gap poses for the performance of the Consortium and its adequate budgetary and technical planning capacity. If it is understood that the partners want to retain their financial autonomy based on the expenditure forecasts, they make on the life cycle of each annual grant, this should in no case condition the availability of resources to face an emergency. There have been cases in which the budgetary criteria of the partners (the availability or not of funds or the consideration of each partner on the cost-efficiency of certain operations) could have had a decisive influence on the competition or not of certain components in some operations, which has been able to distance the Consortium from its mandate to respond to objective humanitarian needs.

### MIRE Human Resources

The evaluative analysis carried out based on Interviews and Questionnaires (1st management and technical staff of the Consortium and an Evaluation Group within the UGC, revealed the situation of **clear overload of the management and especially operational staff of the Consortium**, especially in the positions of Security, Management and Logistics, and similarly in the Mobile Teams. A certain lack of clarity in the delimitation of functions, informality of some decision-making processes, and strenuous working days without adequate rest time were noticed. These affected the overall work of the consortium.

This problem that has not been prioritized by the partners has clearly emerged in the evaluation process in its effort to listen to all voices. **The need to provide the Consortium with a human resources policy in the MIRE** clearly emerges from it.

## 5.10 Has project management incorporated the Rights-Based Approach and, specifically, the gender, ethnic-sensitive, age, functionally diverse and special protection needs perspectives?

Indicator
Level of achieved progress according to LPA database
Tools
Documentary analysis; Interviews and questionnaires (1A and 1-B) with management and technical staff of the Consortium

Beyond the strategy that is available to the partners in their respective institutional and programmatic frameworks, the Consortium has not been equipped with any type of Strategy or specific procedure manual on the operational application of the Rights-Based Approach or in general of any of the cross-cutting approaches. This formal deficit does not imply that the technical staff of the project does not incorporate this view, as well as the procedures followed in the field: the security briefings, the ERN and the MQR system formally incorporate questions that force inquiries and actions respectful of the differential aspects and sensitive to specific needs.

The use of social tools to be able to collect differential information at the time of ERNs and PDM is of vital importance (focus groups, targeted interviews, groups of young people, women, separated men, groups with boys and girls) in addition to meetings with leaders, and allows to have valuable information from different sources and identify non-visible needs. In the ERN that was accompanied (in Buenaventura), the use of these tools by the consortium team was not evident, which cannot be extrapolated to the whole intervention, but must be taken into account for future interventions. It is important to continue strengthening and reinforcing the skills of the staff of the organizations that support the Consortium in gender issues and differential approach and use of social tools for information collection.

### Attention by type of emergency

The conditions of confined, restricted, displaced and multi-affected communities can vary considerably, and their needs are different, especially on the time scale. Despite the fact that the ERNs specify the different effects and that in general the operations of the consortium have varied their intensity in the attentions and deliveries and in the duration of the deployment in the field, during the responses it has not been perceived in the communities a use of intervention tools different by type of emergency, both in the lifting of the ERN itself and in the operation. For communities with multiple affectations (as it was the case in communities in Istmina and Medio San Juan that in November 2021 had had floods and were recently either confined or displaced), it would be important to review the extent of the ERN (greater or lesser need for baseline information) and adapt the type and duration of the required response through continuous monitoring focused on the evolution of the emergency. Part of ACAPS' work has been working together with consortium members to improve data quality and strengthen information collection. As a first step, a workshop was held in January 2022, and a training in March 2022. This important effort, undoubtedly somewhat late in the implementation of the second phase, will already see its fruits in the operation of MIRE III.

### Special protection needs attention

The leaders and people who received the trainings within the framework of the ICLA subcomponent who were consulted in the field by the evaluation team are satisfied with the information and guidance provided to know and implement the planned route within the framework of the Victims Law. These spaces of information and orientation, being collective and in some cases individual, leave installed capacity, at different levels, in the communities, which allows them to have the necessary tools for the demand of rights. We find at this point the main contribution of the Consortium in terms of impact on legal-political frameworks, as well as the installation of capacities that provide tools for the enforceability of rights to

affected people and communities. A limit found at this point is the barrier to access to this information and training: we found that the information received at ICLA does not permeate all the people of the community, and that the integration of the necessary knowledge and its remembrance is manifested only in those leaders who have received previous training.

For its part, APS has included specific protection mechanisms for women, men, boys and girls in the field of gender-based sexual violence (GBV). APS builds community capacities by working with women leaders on emotional approaches to GBV, psychological first aid, and sexual and reproductive rights.

### **Ethnic sensitive protection**

In general, the Consortium through its partners generates important spaces for coordination, information and consultation with the ethnic-territorial authorities, Afro and indigenous organizations in the territories. In the case of Chocó, the work articulated with ACADESAN (Community Council of The Middle San Juan) stands out, which represents 6,583 hectares distributed in 70 communities of the Middle Zone San Juan, Bajo San Juan and Sipi; with COCOMACIA and second degree organizations of the Waonan people (WOUNDEKO).

In the Protection component, by including in the content of the trainings the contents of the differential themes (Victims Law and its ethnic decrees, Victims Decree Law No. 4633 of 2011, for indigenous peoples and Decree Law 4635 of 2011 victims belonging to Black, Afro-Colombian, raizales and palenqueros Communities), the training work allows the direct beneficiaries to recognize their rights as subjects of special protection as well as to demand the application of sensitive approaches in public administration interventions.

In the Shelter component, the housing works carried out in communities have been adapted to the cultural context of the communities, are made of wood, the predominant material in the area and preserve the surrounding structural design, incorporating within the design criteria affectations mainly by floods. Likewise, the habitability kits have been adapted taking into account the number of people per family (structurally derived from sociodemographic and cultural factors) and the uses and customs of the communities (at least in the visited communities).

In the Health component, it was possible to verify in the evaluation visits to the indigenous communities of Istmina the development of days of exchange of knowledge, with community midwives, actions that have been evaluated very positively by the leaders and actors of local health to recover a socio-cultural relevance often neglected in emerging actions and to allow a dialogue between visions of Western and traditional health, from the basis of respect and recognition of the knowledge of indigenous peoples in health care. These types of actions increase the resilience of communities and improve their performance as indispensable health actors in their territory. Likewise, the dialogue between psychology personnel and traditional health personnel, facilitating knowledge and understanding of these mental illnesses is carried out from indigenous worldviews and promoting complementary interventions between traditional knowledge and clinical psychology.

The implementation of pedagogical strategies deployed by MDM during the medical consultation and the delivery of medicines, to explain the treatment to indigenous and illiterate communities, through graphs and drawings, as well as in the integration in the consultation of translators, relatives and leaders, to ensure a good use of medicines and a facilitation of follow-up to treatment, is highlighted as good practice.

The SAN component has been working on diversifying food assistance products to adapt the MIRE response to the needs of ethnicities and some population groups. It is worth mentioning that ACH includes foods of ethnic preference, and local consumption to distribute in the food packages (banana, corn flour, 7 grains cereal, oats flakes, Casabe, Fariña, Mañoco, Corn, Quinoa, Soy and Oats). The composition of the package follows a process of prior consultation and acceptance by communities on food preferences, local availability and market access.

## Gender sensitive protection

In some of the field evaluation visits to affected communities (Nariño) the evaluation team was able to verify the following activities of the APS response that were of high impact in terms of training:

- ✓ Group psychosocial support workshops which had the participation of leaders of the villages of the municipality. These workshops allowed the identification and prioritization of women for individual attention by GBV.
- ✓ Awareness-raising activities in SSR: "Towards a conscious and resignified menstruation"
- ✓ Psychological First Aid School with a rights-based approach (including a gender approach)

With regard to deliverables, it has been noted that dignity kits (18 items) have been delivered to women between 14 and 40 years old. The kits are tailored to the specific needs of women based on their status (pregnancy, nursing mothers, etc.) and age. For example: i) providing basic personal care items to women of reproductive age; ii) special attention is paid to COVID-19 protection supplies for the elderly; and iii) women and girls receive protective equipment (flashlights, whistles, etc.) and are informed about violence related to the armed conflict. iv) delivery of ecological diapers that significantly reduce the environmental footprint. Dignity kits integrate messages that deconstruct beliefs and taboos related to menstruation, or that promote sexual hygiene and reproductive health aiming to preventing teenage pregnancies.

In meetings with the entities and communities in Roberto and Magüí Payán, it was possible to demonstrate the good reception of the activities developed by APS on the issues of protection of women and the satisfaction of the beneficiaries in terms of the workshops, dignity kits and received psychosocial support. At the institutional level, the mayor's offices recognize this support as especially important since it makes dynamics that are not easily identifiable (especially in emergency contexts) emerge such as cases of domestic violence and GBV, recruitment dynamics, psycho-social health problems, etc. However, some institutions at the local level (Mayor's Offices) report that the routes for the attention of cases are very complex to comply with due to the limitations that exist in these municipalities and that they must adapt to these conditions.



### 5.11 Do the Consortium's operations sufficiently meet the needs of vulnerable populations, with an emphasis on people in need of special protection?

Indicator
Achieved coverage levels according to LPA database
Tools
Documentary analysis


The OCHA estimates offer us the possibility of determining in an approximate way the relationship between the MIRE goals (I and II) and what they have represented in terms of effective coverage of the humanitarian needs derived from the conflict and acts of armed violence. According to the director of OCHA in Colombia, the international humanitarian architecture covers on average 44% of the emergencies derived from the conflict in the country (including MIRE operations). In relation to displacements, 40% of them would have been covered in 2021, as well as 58% of confinements. This would mean that MIRE covers a little less than half of the emergencies attended by international humanitarian agencies and organizations.

2020						
Confined population in Colombia	Massively Displaced Population in Colombia	Beneficiary population designated by MIRE I (Logical Framework)	Potential coverage MIRE I (Logical Framework)	Number of emergencies arising from acts of armed violence in Colombia	Number of emergencies arising from acts of armed violence in Colombia attended by MIRE	% of coverage programmed by MIRE I on effective emergencies
45.940 *	26.291*	48.000- 50.000 **	70%	121*	46**	38%
2021						
Confined population in Colombia	Massively Displaced Population in Colombia	Beneficiary population designated by MIRE II (Logical Framework)	Potential coverage MIRE II (Logical Framework)	Number of emergencies arising from acts of armed violence in Colombia	Number of emergencies arising from acts of armed violence in Colombia attended by MIRE	% of coverage programmed by MIRE II on effective emergencies
65.685 *	73.974*	35.823	25%	222*	25****	11,2%
CONSOLIDATED MIRE (I + II)						
Confined population in Colombia	Massively Displaced Population in Colombia	Beneficiary population designated by MIRE I and II (Logical Framework)	Potential coverage MIRE I and II (Logical Framework)	Number of emergencies arising from acts of armed violence in Colombia	Number of emergencies arising from acts of armed violence in Colombia attended by MIRE	% of coverage programmed by MIRE on effective emergencies
111.625 *	100.265*	85.823	40,5%	333*	71****	21,32%

### Coverage according to beneficiary profile



By recognized functional diversity	
a. Physical disability	141
b. Intellectual disability	32
c. Multiple Disability	14
d. Psychic disability	3
e. Sensory disability	14
f. Does not know / report	7.116
g. No disability	38.049
<b>Total</b>	<b>45.369</b>



Below, and in the light of the information obtained through the exploitation of the Consortium's LPA database, we give an account of the most relevant findings:



- ✓ At least 66% of the population attended by the MIRE is recognized as belonging to ethnic groups other than mestizo. This fact reaffirms the need to explicitly include in the project an Intervention Strategy and procedures that transversalize the ethnic-sensitive approach with identity and cultural relevance, as well as the need to include in the design of care and in the planning, monitoring and evaluation of operations to authorities and organizations of indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, palenqueros and raizales, as the case may be, and to promote the training of project personnel in intervention techniques adapted to the majority cultural contexts of intervention.
- ✓ The data collected by the LPA indicates that 0.45% of the total number of unique people benefited by MIRE II have some type of disability.
- ✓ In the population benefited by MIRE operations there are as many adults up to 50 years as NNAJ, and an "elderly" population (although the age range to define it is more than debatable) of 13.4%. The most significant thing is that the average age (calculated from the median of all the age values of the people attended by MIRE II) is 19 years old (being the average of 24.5 years). This has implications when it comes to proposing the general intervention strategy of the MIRE, and specifically to limit and weigh the casuistry in order to improve the relevance of the methodologies and procedures of attention.


### Coverage by operations and sectors

Despite its formal start in April 2021, the operation of the MIRE II was effectively extended over 10 months (from June 2021 to March 2022), adding a total of 23 formal operations (although in reality there were 21, since 4 of them actually correspond to only 2 emergencies).

Num	Code	Month	Department	Alert time/Admission	Emergency duration	Emergency type	Multisectorality	Partners	Num sectors	Num communities
1	AMLA-007.1	Julio	Amazonas	40	7	Desastre	NO (SAL, SAN)	MDM, ACH	2	29
2	ANCA-007.1	Julio-agosto	Antioquia	50	30	Multiple	SI (PRO, EeE, SHE, SAN)	NRC, ACH	4	4
3	ANDA-110.1	sept	Antioquia	12	3	Confinamiento	SI (PRO, WASH, SAN)	NRC, ACH, APS	3	8
4	ANIT-055.1	julio-sept	Antioquia	13	30	Desplazamiento	SI (PRO, SHE, WASH, SAN, SAL)	NRC, ACH, APS, MDM	5	35
5	ANTU-137.1	oct	Antioquia	22	7	Confinamiento	SI (PRO, EeE, SHE, SAN)	NRC, APS, ACH	4	1
6	BOSA-069.1	ago	Bolívar	7	24	Desplazamiento	SI (PRO, SHE, SAN)	NRC, APS, ACH	3	1
7	CABU-059.1	ago	Cauca	20	13	Desplazamiento	SI (PRO, SHE, WASH)	NRC, APS	3	1
8	CHBA-101.1	oct-dic	Chocó	35	39	Multiple	SI (PRO, EeE, WASH, SAN, SALUD)	NRC, ACH, APS, MDM	5	6
9	CHIS-148.1	nov	Chocó			Multiple	SI (PRO, EIE, SHE, WASH, SAN, SAL)	NRC, ACH, APS, MDM	6	10
10	CHME-033.1	julio	Chocó	16	13	Confinamiento	SI (EeE, WASH, SAN)	NRC, APS, ACH	3	7
11	CHME-137.1	nov	Chocó	3	30	Confinamiento	NO (PRO, EeE)	NRC	2	3
12	CHNO-188.1	nov-dic	Chocó	20	18	Confinamiento	SI (PRO, EeE, SAN)	NRC, ACH	3	15
13	CHNU-078.1	ago-oct	Chocó (Nuquí)	20	50	Multiple	SI (PRO, EIE, SHE, WASH, SAN, SAL)	NRC, ACH, APS, MDM	6	7
14	CHQU-038.1	jul-ago	Chocó	60	14	Multiple	SI (PRO, EeE, SHE, WASH)	NRC, ACH, APS	4	1
15	COTI-005.1	julio	Córdoba (TA)	50	5	Multiple	SI (PRO, EeE, SHE, WASH, SAN)	NRC, ACH, APS	5	5
16	COTI-005.2	julio	Córdoba (Mont)	50	15	Multiple	SI (PRO, EeE, SHE, WASH)	NRC, APS	4	35
17	CAAR-151.1	oct	Cauca (Arg)	2	21	Desplazamiento	SI (PRO, EeE, SHE, WASH)	NRC, APS	4	3
18	GUSS-139.1	nov	Guaviare	30	18	Multiple	SI (PRO, EeE, WASH, SAN, SAL)	NRC, ACH, APS, MDM	5	5
19	MEPU-123.1	oct-nov	Meta	32	11	Multiple	SI (PRO, EIE, SHE, WASH, SAN, SAL)	NRC, ACH, APS, MDM	6	5
20	NANA-091.1	sept-oct	Nariño	20	22	Desplazamiento	SI (PRO, EeE, WASH, SAN, SAL)	NRC, ACH, APS, MDM	5	6
21	NARO-001.1	jun-jul	Nariño	11	39	Desplazamiento	SI (PRO, EIE, SHE, WASH, SAN, SAL)	NRC, ACH, APS, MDM	6	33
22	NARO-290.1	ene-feb	Nariño	5	32	Desplazamiento	SI (EIE, SHE, WASH, SAN, SALUD)	NRC, ACH, APS, MDM	5	3
23	VABU-297.1	feb-mar								
24	VIPU-292.1	feb-mar								

### Scope and geographical and typological coverage

- ✓ A total of **45,902 unique people** has been attended<sup>4</sup> for (45,877 in general attention during operations + 125 attended in other operations by Protection-APS). If we take into account the number of people victims of displacement and confinement in Colombia estimated by OCHA in 2021 (139,659) and that we already pointed out in the section dedicated to Coverage at the Design level of the MIRE intervention, **we have that MIRE II covered in practice, approximately one third of the population affected by armed conflict during its second phase.**
- ✓ Attention has been deployed with massive operations in **9 departments**, and another in 7 with only some particular attention to adults, women victims of GBV or minors at risk, over a total of 44 municipalities and reaching people from more than 225 communities. Chocó was the department with most of the emergencies (7) and Unique People attended (more than 17,000, that is, almost a third of all the people attended by MIRE II), well ahead of Nariño (9600) and Antioquia (6100).
- ✓ Regarding the **types of attended emergency**, MIRE II intervened in 1 natural disaster, 7 displacements, 4 confinements and 9 events with multiple affectation



<sup>4</sup> This data only takes into account 21 operations for which consolidated LPA is available (excluding the operations of Valle del Cauca and Vichada)

## Attended people by sector

The verification of the progress for the effective fulfilment of the goals has been carried out based on the exhaustive exploitation of the database formed by the Lists of Attended People reported by the partners.

		PUA TOTAL	PROT-ICLA	PROT-PR	EeE	SHEL	WASH	WASH IPC	SAN	SAL
1	AMLA-007.1	2092							1957	378
2	ANCA-007.1	150	30		70	120			108	
3	ANDA-110.1	976	489						974	974
4	ANIT-055.1	4921	4174	212		64	2759	1053	700	773
5	ANTU-137.1	111	20		44	101			106	
6	BOSA-069.1	2472	2421			80			76	
7	CABU-059.1	236		102		229	229	229		
8	CAAR-151.1	2433	1309	35	94	1232	1272	1000		
9	CHBA-101.1	3088	182	379	468		981	1500	478	173
10	CHIS-148.1	6044	128	241	210	271	1921	1133	1712	868
11	CHME-003.1	2643			892		2465		1316	
12	CHME-187.1	618	131		488					
13	CHNO-188.1	2127	412		466				1822	
14	CHNU-078.1	3054	1625	490	917	2307	2321	943	2447	865
15	CHQU-038.1	102	33	31	36	101	101			
16	COTI-005.1	337	62		170	261	281		291	
17	COTI-005.2	1653	251		411	1350	1377		1377	
18	GUSA-139.1	1446	109		330		1034	594	1001	593
19	MEPU-123.1	1728	213		150	561	595	991	574	387
20	NAMA-091.1	1461	175	345	390		1269	996	372	
21	NARO-001.1	4808		113	1314	3104	1980	1270	520	1345
22	NAMO-290.1	3377			258	126	1391	2473	97	429
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>45877</b>	<b>11764</b>	<b>1948</b>	<b>6708</b>	<b>9907</b>	<b>19976</b>	<b>12182</b>	<b>15928</b>	<b>6785</b>

## Responsiveness

- ✓ Regarding what was reported by the UGC, MIRE II would have responded to 23 emergencies out of 53 alerts published by the EHP, of which 42 fell within its sphere of competence.
- ✓ The **average response time**, measured as the time lag between the constancy of the alert and the entry of the first MIRE sector, has been **24 days** (see table above). This is a priori a rather surprising fact that does not indicate a direct responsibility of the Consortium, since it is not the responsibility of the MIRE neither to generate the alerts nor to activate before its contest is requested by the local respondents.
- ✓ As for the **intensity of the operations** we see that the July-November period was really intensive in the number of emergencies covered by the MIRE (up to 8 and 7 in July and August) and that since November there has been a stabilization of around 3 operations per month. However, the number of operations is not tied to net effort in terms of care. The **average number of unique people attended for emergencies has been 2166**, and **per month, 5650**.

## Quality

- ✓ The **average time spent** in the attended areas has been **23 days**, which does not mean that they were all days of operation, since the income of the sectors was not always staggered immediately consecutively.
- ✓ As for **multisectorality**, we have the following quite defining data of what the main added value of the MIRE has represented in practice:
  - defining as multisectoral that MIRE operation in which 3 or more sectors intervene, we can affirm that a large majority of operations were multisectoral (22 out of 24)
  - on average, **Operation MIRE II deployed 4 sectors for each emergency**
  - however, **only 1 in five beneficiaries (19.5%) accessed 3 or more sectors and more than half only accessed 1 single sector**, as reflected in the table below, based on the breakdown of



access by single person to the different sectors that the exploitation of the project's LPA database allows. This has repercussions for the consideration of the MIRE operation as integral from the point of view of the beneficiaries and impacts on the effective fulfilment of the general secondary goal of the MIRE, as we will see later.

<b>Intersectorality</b>	<b>Total PUA</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Number of unique people receiving care in 1 sector</b>	24241	54,7
<b>Number of people receiving care in 2 sectors</b>	11462	25,9
<b>Number of people receiving care in 3 sectors</b>	5555	12,5
<b>Number of people receiving care in 4 sectors</b>	2076	2,7
<b>Number of people receiving care in 5 sectors</b>	943	2,1
<b>Number of people receiving care in 6 sectors</b>	53	0,1
<b>Number of people receiving care in 3 or more sectors</b>	8628	19,5

## 6 Lessons learned

Below, we list the main lessons learned that have been highlighted by the management and technical staff of the Consortium, both in the In-Depth Interviews that were carried out and, in the questionnaires, (1A and 1B) applied.

<b>Decisional integration and ad intra articulation process</b>	The great learning that the experience of designing, starting-up and optimizing the MIRE process since its genesis has meant for all partners is highlighted. The exchange of specialized knowledge, the ability to resolve differences and to be able to carry out very complex operations in areas and situations of high insecurity in a solvent and articulated manner. There are many dilemmas and challenges of both a strategic and operational nature that this evaluation has systematized and that must be addressed in the face of a truly performative continuity of the MIRE, but its resolution is part of the planned improvements and to be incorporated into the formulation of MIRE III.
<b>Ad extra articulation process</b>	The capacity of the MIRE to position itself in a relatively short time (3 years) as a unique Mechanism in the country is highlighted, its intervention is appreciated by the holders of obligations due to its capacity of activation and it is referential for the type of response it offers.
<b>Prolonged response</b>	The staggered response has been revealed for beneficiaries and partners as an ideal procedure that on the one hand solves the different activation times of components with different logistical needs and at the same time satisfies the needs of permanence in the territory of the equipment that is perceived and appreciated as an element of added protection. Although in objective terms the protection by presence presents obvious doubts in contexts where unfamiliar and overawed of IHL armed actors operate, it is expected that the extension of operations to times exceeding one month will allow a substantial improvement in the aid provided by the MIRE, especially regarding the insertion of cross-cutting approaches and post-distribution evaluation and monitoring mechanisms.

<b>Operational process improvements</b>	The increase in agility in the analysis of alerts is highlighted thanks to more experienced personnel, greater mutual knowledge between mobile teams, rolled consortium procedures and increasingly complete, relevant and operable formats, greater clarity in the guidelines and information gathering and articulation processes in the territory.
<b>Emphasis on quality</b>	Since response times are always optimizable in the field of emergency aid, the Consortium's commitment is clearly moving towards a gradual increase in the quality of operations, focused on improving the articulation (from the ERN uprising), in a selection of the activations that goes in the direction of responding to those emergencies more voluminous in number of affected people and in number of required sectors, which will increase the Mechanism's cost-efficiency.
<b>More cohesive and optimized human team in their workflows</b>	An aspect highlighted by the management and technical staff at the level of the operation has been the one related to the need to deepen the reciprocal knowledge and the spaces of articulation between the mobile teams' personnel. Likewise, a wide margin for improvement in the working conditions of UGC personnel and mobile teams has been detected, which could be solved taking into account the existing budgetary margin at the level of support costs, and which could materialize in the Creation of a third Mobile Team exclusively dedicated to ERN raisings.

## 7 Annexes

The following documents are presented in Annex. In Spanish.

- ✓ **Anexo 0.** Informe de evaluación en su **versión extensa**, incluyendo las **Conclusiones y Recomendaciones** producidas a través del proceso evaluador
- ✓ **Anexo 1.** Términos de Referencia de la convocatoria
- ✓ **Anexo 2.** Metodología: herramientas aplicadas, listado exhaustivo de actividades realizadas y actores consultados, bibliografía empleada
- ✓ **Anexo 3.** Informes sectoriales
- ✓ **Anexo 4.** Cumplimiento de los Compromisos de la Norma Humanitaria Esencial (CHS)
- ✓ **Anexo 5.** CV Equipo Evaluador del IECAH
- ✓ **Anexo 6.** Evaluando MIRE II - Presentación hallazgos
- ✓ **Anexo 7.** Evaluación de la Evaluación

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Norwegian Refugee Council  
Postboks 148 Sentrum  
0102 Oslo, Norway



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